INTRODUCTION
Against enormous odds, non-violent action proved to be a major factor in the downfall of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic black majority government. This came despite the fact that movements working for fundamental change in South Africa faced unprecedented obstacles. Never had such a powerful and highly industrialised state been overthrown from within. Opponents of apartheid faced a complex web of regulations which produced a rigid stratification system which severely limited dissent by the oppressed majority. Apartheid South Africa defied most traditional political analyses, due to its unique social, political, economic and strategic position. It practised one of history's most elaborate systems of internal colonialism, with a white minority composed of less than one-fifth of the population in absolute control. The ruling party was led by racialists who also possessed an unusual level of political sophistication. They controlled some of the world's richest mineral deposits, including one-third of the earth's known gold reserves. A modern military machine stood ready in an area which lacked any other large conventional force. Its internal since the government was able to link them in the eyes of the public and justify their repression. Not only were most of those involved in the bombing campaign captured, but the turn to violence was used to justify the rounding up of many other suspected dissidents as well. Although the ANC explicitly directed their campaign towards property, a number of their trained attackers used their explosives on the homes of pro-government blacks, killing several people, including children. This not only invited further government repression, but resulted in a loss of support by some Africans as well. Given the tendency for those in authority to treat opposition movements by reference to their most violent components, the armed struggle in its early stages probably did more harm than good to the movement against apartheid.
However, given the level of repression against non-violent activists within the country, and the successes of outgunned armed liberation movements elsewhere, there was the widespread belief for most of the I 960s and I 970S that the armed struggle would play a major role in the downfall of apartheid. The problem was that those who dreamed of liberating their country through force of arms faced enormous obstacles.
White South Africa possessed by far the most powerful military machine on the continent. By the early i98os, it had a rigorously trained operational force of i8o,ooo men and, with a reserve force constantly replenished through universal white male conscription, it could mobilise nearly half a million troops within a few hours (Leonard i98i: I3).
In addition, a cadet programme of military training for secondary students would grow to 300,000 within the next few years (ibid.), and every white man and woman was required from adolescence to learn marksmanship. The number of guns per capita for the white population was among the highest in the world, while apart from the Io,ooo blacks in special military units and some police, no blacks were allowed to carry firearms under any circumstances.2 The estimated combined forces of all black African states and liberation movements south of the equator came to less than half that of South Africa. In terms of military equipment, South Africa had an even greater advantage. The South African air force possessed over 875 aircraft, including over 500 combat aircraft and more than 2oo helicopters; the army owned over 260 tanks, i,300 armoured cars, over I i0 armoured personnel carriers, and a large number of self-propelled medium and heavy artillery guns (Leonard I 98 I: 20) . The material of the liberation movements and black African states was limited to small, outdated Western arms and a limited supply of modest-grade Soviet hardware.
Only Angola had major military equipment within its borders, and this was largely in the hands of Cuban forces defending the government from US and South African-backed UNITA rebels.
There was little promise of an organised force of African nations launching a successful invasion of South Africa. The Organisation of African Unity lacked any coordinated military organisation, leadership or general staff, training techniques or doctrine. Zaire, Ethiopia and Nigeria, the sub-Saharan states with the largest standing armies, required their armed forces for internal control. Nor could Cuba, or other states allied with the black South African cause, be expected to redirect substantial numbers of their troops away from their own national defence needs. Opposition by the United States and other Western states would have prevented any kind of United Nations or other multinational force from being deployed.
Until November I977, when the mandatory United Nations embargo went into effect, South Africa was the recipient of highly sophisticated weaponry from Israel, France and other countries. The embargo did not significantly alter the strategic balance, since a large amount of outside arms were getting into the country anyway, and, more importantly, South Africa had by that time become almost selfsufficient militarily. The government was manufacturing its own tanks, mine-clearing vehicles, missiles and even napalm and nerve gas.3 No guerrilla movement could hope to combat such a powerful armed force on its own territory effectively, especially when South Africa's preparedness for such an attack was considered. South African forces were being trained by the highly effective Israeli counter-insurgency units (Southern African Committee I978: I4). In addition, an investigation at that time noted how (Adam I97I: I25-6):
Five special 'anti-terrorist' training camps have been strategically established for training in camouflage and disguise, the establishment of bases, tracking, field shooting, convoy and ambush drill. The Defense Minister told Parliament that the men were kept informed of counter-measures against the latest terrorist tactics throughout the world. The Air Force has been reorganized for greater mobility and is being integrated with the anti-guerrilla combat forces. An underground air defense radar station has been constructed at Devon in the eastern Transvaal as the nerve center of the northern area's early warning system. Information is fed into computers from radar heads above ground and from various remote satellite stations. Three thousand miles of South Africa's northern borders are reported being patrolled night and day... An underground radio communications center is [located] at Westlake near Cape Town. Its computer produces on demand a map of the shipping in any selected portion of the ocean.
Portuguese and white Rhodesians willingly moved to South Africa or returned to their European homelands after liberation. White South Africans, however, had lived in their land for many generations -most Afrikaners traced their ancestry back at least two and a half centuries -and would have nowhere to go. In the face of a violent liberation movement, they would probably have fought to the bitter end. It is likely that the full military might of the South African state would have been unleashed against whole communities, with enormous destructive potential. Many whites on the far right began stockpiling arms for what they saw as an inevitable race war, which they had an almost messianic commitment to resist to the last Afrikaner.
Also, unlike these former colonies, South Africa was a modern, industrialized state. It was the major industrial power of the continent, if not the southern hemisphere. It was the only country in Africa with major iron and steel industries, advanced engineering facilities and petrochemical plants. The industrial infrastructure, through its then quasi-governmental administration, was intrinsically linked to the military establishment.
The black townships outside South African cities were designed so that they could be easily cordoned off and subjected to air strikes, making it easy for the military to suppress any armed uprising. While some ANC leaders began to advocate a 'people's war' of massive armed resistance within the townships in the mid-Ig80s, such a scenario was never realistic. Unlike Algiers, or other locations of successful urban guerrilla warfare, there was no maze of alleys in which guerrillas could lose those in pursuit. The black townships were built as grids, with wide thoroughfares, making it difficult for a guerrilla to find shelter. In addition, the record of urban guerrilla warfare in the preceding years, as in Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, did not offer a very hopeful precedent.
The Bantustans -the small, non-contiguous, remote rural areas set aside by the apartheid system for the black majority -presented basically the same situation on a larger scale. Because of their geographical fragmentation and tight rule by hand-picked elites, they could hardly be ideal bases for guerrilla warfare. There were strong pressures, both internally and externally, on the leadership of the homelands to work with the South African military, and several were cooperating quite closely (Karis i983-4). In addition, less than 42 per cent of the population was male, the majority of these being under I5 or over 65, limiting the number of potential recruits Johnson I977: 300).
Meanwhile, the 4 million blacks in white rural areas, I44 STEPHEN ZUNES labouring primarily as farm hands, were so utterly dependent on their white overlords and geographically separated, that there was little reason to think that they would shift dramatically away from their traditional conservatism and non-involvement in popular resistance movements, so as to be able to contribute to an armed revolution. Another problem was that the terrain in South Africa was totally unsuitable for guerrilla warfare. The South African countryside consists mostly of open areas of desert and savanna, especially in the strategically important Transvaal, and there were virtually no sanctuaries, such as mountains and jungles, in which to retreat or establish bases of operation. In addition, unlike other countries that experienced successful guerrilla warfare, South Africa was a highly urbanised society, with modern communications and transport facilities, so there would be little opportunity to avoid detection and attack.
Guerrilla raids from neighbouring independent states would also have been problematic, since they would have been susceptible to offensive military actions by South African forces. South Africa made frequent attacks in Angola against SWAPO bases and refugee camps during their occupation of Namibia, as well as numerous minor incursions. There were three major attacks deep inside Mozambique during the i98os, attacking alleged ANC homes and offices. There were also raids during this period into Zambia, Lesotho and Botswana. It was unlikely that a newly independent Namibia would take the risk of provoking conflict with its giant neighbour, on which it was still dependent. Even the tiny Rhodesian army had been capable of making devastating raids against its neighbours, and the prospects made these black states, already in desperate economic shape from previous wars and dependent on South Africa economically, extremely wary about harbouring guerrillas. The ANC refused to make a public estimate, presumably because of its embarrassment at the paucity of men under arms. Even taking into account the high ratio of military personnel over insurgents needed to suppress a guerrilla movement, the ANC could hardly have been considered a formidable military threat for many years to come.
Despite twenty-five years of armed resistance, and large amounts of military aid and training from the Soviet Bloc, the ANC was able to show 'little serious military capabiity' (Uhlig i986: I70), and, militarily speaking was referred to as 'one of the world's least successful "liberation movements"' (Lelyveld i983).
Random terror, as attempted in the poqo campaign of the early I 960s, or even on a larger and better-coordinated scale, would not have been helpful. Terrorism has traditionally united the opposition, often making them more entrenched, while dividing the aggrieved population -in effect, the opposite of non-violent action. The traditional justification for terrorism, that it would allow the state to reveal its truly repressive nature, certainly did not apply to apartheid South Africa: not only was the repressive nature of the state obvious to any black South African, but their largely non-violent resistance brought out the repressive apparatus without providing the needed rationalisation of curbing terrorism.
It was under these circumstances that the ANC and other resistance organisations in the early I980s began to seriously question whether armed struggle would be successful. The Soviet Union, the chief military backer of the ANC, which had long since joined Western countries in doubting the military capability of the ANC armed wing, supported a negotiated settlement, and saw continued armed struggle I46 STEPHEN ZUNES as counterproductive (Price i 99i: 9). Many South Africans also questioned whether they were willing to subject their country to the mass murder, ecocide and rampant devastation that occurred in Vietnam. Unlike the Vietnamese, the South African revolutionaries would not have had a terrain favourable for guerrilla warfare, or available sanctuaries; nor would their opponent have been in unfamiliar territory, far from supply lines, be proxies for a corrupt regime with little popular support or have a large anti-war movement with which to contend.
A violent strategy would have led inevitably to spiralling escalation, with the state having the strategic edge at every turn in the foreseeable future. Even had the blacks eventually won, it would have probably have left millions dead and a ravaged country. Many skilled whites needed to maintain specialised positions during the interim period before a sufficient number of blacks (denied advancement under apartheid) could take these positions, would be killed or driven into exile. Armed resistance in South Africa would probably have attracted many of the least disciplined elements from African society under apartheid, thus blurring the distinction between revolutionary action and hooliganism. This would have resulted in a widespread amoral effect on an entire younger generation of South Africans needed to rebuild their country, a problem which has proved to be difficult enough, even with the relatively limited revolutionary violence that did occur.
There has been a tendency for non-violent movements to maintain a more democratic and inclusive character than armed movements (Sharp i980), a factor that many black South Africans undoubtedly considered after years of living under a most undemocratic and exclusivist system. In addition, since a violent struggle would have tended to be directed more against people than a non-violent struggle, which tends to aim at institutional and systemic targets, there would have been a greater chance of the revolutionary struggle taking on a more destructive racialist orientation. In addition, as Liddell Hart (I967: 204) observes:
The habit of violence takes deeper root in irregular warfare than it does in regular warfare. In the latter it is counteracted by the habit of obedience to constituted authority, whereas the former makes a virtue of denying authority and violating rules. It becomes very difficult to rebuild a country and a stable state on such an undermined foundation. (i) How to achieve the maximum strength and involvement in the struggle by the non-whites, mainly the Africans.
(2) How to split some of the whites from support for the Afrikaner Nationalists and white domination, and move them towards action in support of the non-whites.
(3) How to bring the maximum international pressures to bear on the South African government towards change compatible with the selfdetermination of the South African people as a whole and their future development.
Non-violent action proved to be the most effective means of achieving those criteria.
While maintaining their commitment to pursue armed struggle, both on principle as well as a strategy of disrupting normal operations of the repressive state, the South African opposition reached a clear consensus by the early I980s that liberation had to be pursued through largely non-violent methods. Despite the romantic rhetoric of international solidarity groups in the US and elsewhere of a victorious ANC army marching to Pretoria,4 the ANC never saw armed struggle as the sole or even primary means for bringing down the apartheid regime (Price I99I: 9). Strategic analyst Thomas Karis, writing in I986 (I34), noted that 'despite a commitment to armedd struggle", the ANC has considered sabotage and guerrilla attacks to be only a minor strand in a multifaceted strategy consisting mainly of politically inspired demonstrations, strikes and defiance'. By the I980s, the ANC saw strikes and boycotts as 'a main element in the organization's strategy for liberation' (Uhlig I986: I69), emphasizing that the armed struggle was only 'one strand' in the fabric or resistance strategies which included civil disobedience (ibid.: I 70). The ANC even acknowledged that most of its acts of sabotage and small-scale guerrilla attacks were no more than 'armed propaganda' (Karis I986: II 2). Indeed, during the anti-Republic Day campaign of I98I, when hundreds of thousands of people took part in protest rallies all around the country, and a successful general strike demonstrated the level at which the opposition could mount a successful mobilization, the ANC launched about half a dozen attacks against strategic targets While the African National Congress is known for its anti-government guerilla attacks, its leaders also seem wary about any over-emphasis on military rather than political activity. The ANC President's first public statement of I984 exhorted all South Africans to 'create conditions in which the country will become increasingly ungovernable'.
In effect, the ANC recognised that the non-cooperation of the people was critical, and that it was the ungovernability of the country by the apartheid regime, and not its physical overthrow, which would end apartheid. Thus, while never formally renouncing armed struggle until the peace process was well under way, there was a growing recognition through the I98os In i987, migrant mineworkers began bringing their wives into single-sex compounds in defiance of mine management and government regulations (ibid.: 94).
In addition, the non-violent resistance by workers and commuters in the Ciskei bantustan in I983, centred on a bus fare increase and poor working conditions in factories, which was met by brutal repression by a joint effort of the homeland regime, the South African government and big business, marked a turning point in delegitimising the whole grand apartheid scheme, by demonstrating to white South Africans that the homelands policy was based on fear and force, not on a benign mutually beneficial programme of' separate development' (Frederickse i987:III-I2).
The centrality of the townships became apparent to both the South African government and the ANC following the Soweto uprisings. The whites had to acknowledge that a black urban population was a permanent fixture in South African society and its economy. The white paper which accompanied the Riekert Commission Report emphasised that 'black labour represents by far the largest proportion of the total labour force ... in the so-called "'White area" '. Furthermore, it projected a far greater increase in the black population than for the whites (RSA I979).
This acknowledged the vulnerability of the government and the entire South African economy to strikes and other forms of non-violent disruption by the black majority. According to Price (i99i:
The black worker, whose increasing militancy since the Durban strikes of I 973 threatened to undermine South Africa as a haven for multinational investors, and who during the Soweto uprising showed a growing willingness to support radical youth with political strikes, was a township resident. Townships represented both a source of skilled workers, and an enormous untapped domestic market for South Africa's manufactured goods. And the townships, easily accessible to journalists, offered the international media vivid material to reveal the reality of black deprivation in South Africa.
Non-violent resistance against white minority rule has a long history in South Africa, going back as far Mohandas Gandhi's non-violent campaigns in Natal at the turn of the century. A half century later, the Of the ioooo volunteers called for, more than 8500 had gone voluntarily to jail despite the intimidating effect of police action, of dismissal by employers, and the propaganda of the bulk of the press and the radio; some teachers who had done little before had thrown up their jobs to defy; the United Nations had been inspired to discuss apartheid and the press of the world had taken the nonwhite challenge to oppression more seriously than ever before.
As Benson (ibid.: I 5 I) observed:
October was the peak of the Campaign. For the first time in the history of modern South Africa, the Africans' militant achievement had kept the initiative hard-won through discipline and self-sacrifice. Only one thing could rob them of such initiative: violence.
Violence did indeed break out, and the Campaign was crippled (Sharp I973: 599).
At the peak of the civil disobedience movement, after it had been in motion for about six months, a series of African riots broke out between October i8 and November 9. Six whites were killed and thirty-three Africans. The white dead included a nun who had been missionary doctor of the Africans: her body was spoliated. This contributed to the sensationalism and to feelings that repression was 'justified'. The precise causes of the riots are not clear. The resistance leaders demanded an enquiry, which the government refused. There was no evidence that the resistance movement was responsible, and there were suggestions that agents provocateurs may have been involved. In any case, the effects of the riots were to damp down the spirit of resistance'. clearly the riots played a decisive role. Quite apart from their effect on the resisters, the riots provided the opportunity for the Government to take over the initiative and to assume far-reaching powers with some measure of justification.
Zulu Chief and anti-apartheid leader
It appears that the campaign's successes were limited not because it was non-violent, but in large part because of the limited violence that did occur. The government refused demands by the resisters that a Judicial Commission of Inquiry be appointed to investigate the causes of the riots, strengthening the belief that the violence was indeed government inspired. The use of agents provocateurs throughout the history of the resistance movement demonstrated that the white minority government strongly preferred the black resistance movement not to use non-violence. The government felt threatened by the use of massive, disciplined non-violent resistance, as demonstrated by its harsh counteractions during the Defiance Campaign and other times when similarly challenged.
A major factor in the revitalization of the South African resistance was the Black Consciousness movement, which was launched in the early I970s, stressing self-reliance and non-violent resistance. Though Although Fanon's writings were widely read and his ideas of alienation in colonial society had much influence on many of the theorists of black consciousness, there is little evidence that his ideas on violence were much discussed, and none that they were widely shared. It is nowhere seen as being in itself a mentally liberating process; rather its instrumental role properly comes only when consciousness has been achieved by other means.
Similarly, Gail Gerhart (I978: 285-6), writing about the internal resistance movement of the I 970s, adds:
The aim of Black Consciousness as an ideology was not to trigger a spontaneous Fanonesque eruption of the masses into violent action, but rather to rebuild and recondition the mind of the oppressed in such a way that eventually they would be ready forcefully to demand what was rightfully theirs.
The late Black Consciousness Movement leader Steve Biko and other internal resistance leaders stressed the need for non-violence, at least at the early stage of the struggle, and criticised the PAC's 'reckless rush to confrontation when circumstance did not favor a black victory' (Gerhart I978: 285); they similarly criticized armed ANC raids as premature and counterproductive to their work within the country.5
Some activists saw the public espousal of non-violence as a tactical recognition of the need to postpone government repression of the antiapartheid group's public activities, to be followed by a 'second phase' after conscientisation, that of armed struggle. Preliminary clandestine committees were set up by black consciousness leaders to explore that possibility, but these were set aside as advances in the internal and largely non-violent resistance became apparent. There was some pressure from militants both in the leadership and at the grassroots about moving to active armed resistance, but the tactical advantages of non-violent resistance, regardless of the sincerity of its initial advocates, had meanwhile won widespread support.
By the I 98os, the ANC and the more traditional nationalist leadership within the country had accepted many aspects of the participatory orientation from the Black Consciousness Movement, and, through their mutual support of the United Democratic Front and trade union federations, maintained a degree of resilience and unity in the face of the worst repression in South Africa's history. It was during this period that they committed themselves to non-violent Thus strikes by vulnerable independent trade unions, whose workers were mostly unskilled, often migrants, and constantly threatened with unemployment, demonstrated their power through strike support and boycotts from the community. More significantly, these evolved into 'long-term, mass-based structures for change in both the workplace and the community' (Frederickse I987: 27). A particularly good example of this phenomenon was the Sarmcol strike in Natal in i985, 
I28-9).
It is noteworthy that the October I985 ban of media coverage of 'unrest' specifically included strikes and boycotts. Yet such labour action escalated still further: in i987, over 20,ooo railway workers struck for over two months, and 340,000 mineworkers struck the Chamber of Mines for three weeks (Smuts & Westcott I99I: I28). In i989 alone, over 3 million person-days were lost from labour disputes in South Africa (ibid.: I 29).
The nationwide two-day general strike in I 984, the largest of its kind in South African history up to that point, terrified the government, and many observers see it, along with the government crackdown which followed, as the starting point of the final wave of unrest which brought the regime to the negotiating table (Frederickse i987: i8o):
As many as 8oo,ooo people refused to go to work and 400,000 students boycotted classes. The strike was more than 8o per cent effective among workers from the besieged Vaal townships, and in the east Rand, where heavy industry and organised labour is concentrated. The SASOL (oil-from-coal) and ISCOR (iron and steel) para-statals ground to a halt, despite threats to fire workers who joined the strike. The transport system designed to carry workers to the Transvaal's industrial centre was abandoned....
The trade union's foray into the political arena, bolstered by the communities and students, was a stunning success: the stay-away strike had been the most successful in South Africa's history. The combined force of the muscle of organised labour and the back-up of the UDF's affiliated organisations had dealt the government a body blow that sent the politicians, the policy and the army reeling.
To try to halt these challenges, the government imposed a state of emergency in I 985 to curve the dissent. Since violent acts were already illegal, the state of emergency was aimed primarily at curbing the unarmed resistance. According to Wink (i987: 79), 'In an eloquent tribute to the power of nonviolence the government had decided, in effect, to treat nonviolence as the equivalent of violence.' Initially, the restrictions were so comprehensive and the penalties so severe, that this hampered the non-violent resistance efforts. For example, merely stating an opposition to military conscription, participating in a nonviolent demonstration, criticising the government or any government official or advocating a boycott, could land one in prison for up to ten years (ibid.: 79-80 (Price 199I: I32) . By the mid-I98os, scores of officially sanctioned local governments in the Black townships collapsed due to massive non-cooperation, and the mayors and town councils, in most of these cases, either resigned or were simply ignored. Pro-ANC/UDF alternative governments were established in face of virtual military occupation.
One of the most striking examples of this was in the Alexandra Township near Johannesburg, which had a population well over IOO,ooo. The alternative government started at the level of the 'yard', where three to five houses, each containing four to five families, shared a courtyard. About six of these yard committees, representing up to twenty-five families, made up a block committee, which then sent representatives to street committees. All of the street committees formed the Alexandra Action Committee, which became the township's defacto government. With the assistance of a white lawyer, they drew up a local constitution based on participatory democracy and formed their own 'people's courts', which dealt with matters such as petty theft, family violence and inter-family disputes.6 When the Action Committee successfully led a rent strike, the official government cut off water supplies and the cleaning of the communal pit toilets. The Action Committee then simply formed their own committees which took up these and other jobs themselves (National Public Radio i987). The rent strikes constituted an overt rejection of the authority of the township councils, making them a major target of state repression (Price I99I: 257).
Not all street and area committees were as democratic and wellfunctioning as those in Alexandra. Some were composed primarily of self-appointed vigilantes who engaged in undemocratic, violent and arbitrary forms of control. Yet, in most cases, they did constitute a model of democratic self-governance, where none had ever existed previously, and became a powerful tool of non-violent resistance to the official government.
Meanwhile, the first general elections based upon the new constitution of i984, which created a tricameral legislature granting the coloured and Indian populations their own parliament alongside (though clearly unequal to) the white parliament, but ignoring the black African majority altogether, resulted in an 8o per cent boycott by those communities; those who did run were so reviled by their respective constituencies that they were essentially unable to campaign There were four major goals of the I 989 campaign: (I) open defiance of the state of emergency to render it ineffective; (2) challenging petty apartheid laws; (3) supporting the rights of black workers by defying anti-labour legislation; and (4) demonstrating the illegitimacy of the tricameral legislative system. The campaign was largely successful, both in making those laws unenforceable, and in rebuilding opposition organisations which had been seriously damaged by the i986 state of emergency. The alliance between the UDF and COSATU was strengthened and members of the white establishment, ranging from the mayor of Cape Town and business leaders, to leaders of the opposition Democratic Party, joined in the movement (Smuts & Westcott I99I: 45-6).
Actions of this kind, far more than the sporadic armed attacks by the ANC, forced the South African government to recognise that its days were numbered. Price (I99I: 45-6) predicted that: the precondition for negotiations leading to fundamental political change in South Africa is an extended period of economic decline and political unrest. Over time a situation of economic, physical and psychological deterioration is likely to impact on strategically important constituencies. Support for the political status quo will consequently erode among elements considered vital by the ruling elite, including segments of its security forces. The government's capacity to control will deteriorate as the costs of security escalates beyond the financial capabilities of a deteriorating economy and its self confidence will collapse as the resources and policy options to turn the situation around ae perceived as exhausted. This process of decline and disaffection will lead to a gradual shift, over time, toward a position where negotiations for some form of fundamental political change, such as majority rule, is deemed acceptable.
According to anti-apartheid activist Dene Smuts (Smuts & Westcott

I99I: 9):
The two historic strands of struggle, violent and nonviolent, were operating simultaneously at the time of the Defiance Campaign of I989. When nonviolent action coexists with a declared policy of armed struggle, it cannot approach Gandhian refinement and control. But, with violence on the ground and with the ambiguous goals of negotiation or takeover, nonviolent action in South Africa in the late i98os -the hunger strikes that ended the mass use of the system of detetion without trial, the beach protests that showed up the injustice of segregation and outrageousness of police action -operated on the same premises Martin Luther King described in his Letter from a Birmingham jail... [that] 'direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront this issue'.
Rather than ungovernability of the townships by the white authorities creating liberated zones which would become a beachhead for an armed assault against white South Africa, as many predicted, it was their ungovernability in itself, combined with effective alternative institutions, that helped force the government to recognise the need for negotiations.
Meanwhile, the largely unarmed resistance and the repressive countermeasures against the movement prompted the non-violent resistance in the industrialized countries to force sanctions. The existing ACTION: DOWNFALL OF APARTHEID i6i cultural, academic and sports boycotts were broadened to include economic sanctions which made a real impact. The British Commonwealth enacted restricted measures in i986; the US, Japan, Canada and several European countries enacted a series of sanctions that same year, while international bankers refused to roll over new loans. Several major corporations disinvested and, while their shares were often just bought up by South African firms, it restricted the amount of capital available to promote economic growth. This, combined with the strikes and other forms of economic resistance by the black majority and the increasing costs of internal security from both the armed and the far more significant unarmed resistance, led South Africa into the economic crisis which forced many of the country's elites to advocate change.
REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NON-VIOLENT EMPHASIS
The non-violent struggle in South Africa ultimately proved successful when sufficient numbers were empowered, mobilised and willing to take the personal risks to challenge the existing order. One complicating factor in the South African struggle had been the use of 'bannings', a form of house arrest, and suspended sentences with limits on political activity, against leaders in the resistance movement. In most cases, the leaders abided by these restrictions rather than face years of imprisonment; most of those who did not fled into exile. The political consequence of this submission was quite negative. Sharp (I 980: I 7 I) noted that:
One of the objective results of the leaders' choice of accepting these limitations, instead of refusing to comply and going to prison, has been to set an example harmful to future resistance. The ordinary opponent of apartheid is not likely to risk a greater punishment than the leaders are seen to be suffering. Yet willingness to undergo imprisonment and other suffering is a primary requirement of change.
The increased willingness to defy banning orders in the late I 980s, as evidenced by Winnie Mandela and others, encouraged greater numbers to openly defy the authorities, and created a climate of resistance in the face of government repression. In August I 989, the UDF and other restricted organizations, along with scores of restricted activities, openly 'unbanned' themselves in a public march in Cape Town (Smuts & Westcott I99I: 49). As one activist at the time described it (ibid.: 45):
A remarkable aspect of the I 989 campaign was that many of the organizations and people taking part 'unbanned' themselves in order to do so. And not only did the i989 campaign, unlike that of I952, take place against the background of a state of emergency -it effectively ended it. When the United Nations Security Council threatened sanctions and other punitive measures against South Africa, the United States, Great Britain and France, due to their important economic and political interests, cast vetoes. By the mid to late i980s, however, thanks to massive non-violent protests in those countries and others by antiapartheid activists, most industrialized nations imposed sanctions on the apartheid regime. Labour unions, church groups, students and leftist organizations made business as usual with the apartheid government impossible. This upsurge in solidarity work came as a result of the largely non-violent resistance in South Africa during the I 980s, and the government repression which resulted. In contrast, had the primary mode of resistance been armed struggle, it is unlikely that the same level of sympathy and the resulting mass mobilization would have been enough to make the sanctions movement so successful.
An editorial in the Weekly
While some attribute the rioting, such as the Soweto uprising of I 976 and subsequent outbursts of violent township protests in the i980s, as a key factor in the end of apartheid, these were probably not decisive. Even as the riots and the repression escalated following the declaration of a state of emergency in I985, heavy government censorship successfully limited media coverage, and interest in the situation waned. Unlike the concomitant non-violent campaigns, the rioters were in large part suppressed. Like the youth rebellions in advanced capitalist countries in the I96os and early I970s, young militants certainly had a disruptive effect, may have inspired some reforms, and further exposed the repressive machinery of the state; but they did not have the power in themselves to force major structural change. Only when the youthful rebels were able to effectively build an alliance with the black working class was real change possible. The Soweto uprisings of I976 illustrate this in both ways. Some Zulu migrant workers were used to brutally suppress the student strikes and other actions in August. However, after careful organising among the workers by striking students, they became largely supportive in the general strike the following month, which led to the most dramatic crisis for the government during that turbulent period. In short, the rioting Soweto youths only began to seriously challenge the white authorities when they stopped rioting, built alliances with workers in the townships, and organised a non-violent movement.
A resurgence of the student boycotts and protests sprang up among ACTION: DOWNFALL OF APARTHEID i67 coloured students in early I980 in the Western Cape. By keeping their protest primarily non-violent, and linking their educational demands to national political grievances, this led to the two-day general strike in June, when 70 per cent of the workers stayed at home. Police repression was severe -over sixty people were kiled in the following week -but it resulted in unprecedented support for the resistance among people of all races (Frederickse i987: i8-i9). When tens of thousands of black students walked out of the classroom in early i984, they were met by repression similar to that in the Soweto uprising. Yet not only was the violence more controlled, they were able to involve workers and their communities in their support, and draw up specific demands for educational improvements (ibid.: i68).
The wave of violent unrest in the mid-ig80s was largely insulated from the white minority community; there was actually less publicity in the white South African media on the unrest than there was in other countries. Often the targets of the rioters were public facilities for Africans, which created rifts within the black populations at a time when unity was of crucial importance. Far more significant, in terms both of building a popular resistance movement and of challenging the state, were the boycotts, strikes, creation of alternative institutions and other forms of largely non-violent resistance. A I98I study by the American Friends Service Committee (I 982: I I2) concluded:
The South African government presents a classic example of bureaucracy, musclebound with arms and ideologically ill-equipped to meet the challenge of massive, nonviolent noncooperation. The government has already demonstrated an inability to use its bludgeoning techniques to foreclose strikes involving even a relatively small geographic area and a relatively small number of workers. What would happen if the black workers, servants, and farm labourers withdrew cooperation on a massive scale in a well-organized nonviolent campaign! Is it possible that at a certain point, as [Zambian president Kenneth] Kaunda puts it, the oppressor will realize that 'he is powerless, in the last resort, to prevent the inevitable because he is trying to fight not an army but an idea, and short of exterminating a whole population he cannot bomb or blast it out of their minds?' The truth of the idea -the releasing of thirty million people to be human -is better served by nonviolent actions which do not deny the basic humanity of the oppressor.
This is exactly what happened in South Africa. And while the struggle was more protracted, more complex and not as exclusively non-violent as some similar struggles during this era, it was one of the most significant. It demonstrated that even where so many had given up on non-violence, key elements of the resistance movement would 3. The embargo did make it impossible for the South African air force to replace its lost jets, thus raising long-term questions regarding its command of the air, and the armed forces of Zimbabwe and some other African states were improving somewhat. However, while such changes could, in the long term, have limited Soth Africa's regional military hegemony, it would not pose a challenge to the apartheid regime itself.
4. Part of the scepticism towards those downplaying the armed struggle came from the fact that many of those who argued against the successful outcome of armed resistance were Western analysts who pushed an equally unrealistic scenario that reform would come through the liberalizing influence of foreign investment and economic development. There was also a problem of romanticising armed struggle within certain leftist circles outside South Africa. For example, this author was purged from an anti-apartheid group at Oberlin College in I 978 because I refused to endorse the principle that military victory by the ANC and PAC was the means of liberation. Similarly strident attitudes towards armed struggle often plagued white radicals in North America and Europe, who supported the anti-apartheid struggle but were unfamiliar with the actual situation on the ground. 5. Lekele chastised those who talked of armed struggle and ignored the crucial differences between the successful liberation struggles in neighbouring countries and the situation in South Africa. At the same time, while he felt armed struggle might be necessary at a later stage, he emphasised that this could only be so in conjunction with massive nonviolent resistance: the 'difference between armed struggle in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa [is] the development of the mass strike and massive political action growing into armed insurrection.' (Marx i980: I5).
6. These peoples' courts are not be confused with the vigilante actions which periodically resulted in the lynching of suspected collaborators which took place in other black townships. These peoples' courts were highly regarded, not only because they were more trusted than the corrupt local magistrates, but because they were often able to actually return stolen property rather than simply punishing the suspect.
A i987 attack by police on an Alexandra peoples' court left eight people dead. A South African court decision soon thereafter, however, limited the ability of government authorities to suppress these popular administrative committees.
7. It is noteworthy that the Alexandra boycott was not organised primarily by the ANC, but by a number of local groups, and the boycotters rejected efforts by the ANC to force a compromise.
